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Abstract
We model a market for news where prot maximizing media outlets choose their
editors from a population of rational citizens. We show that when information ac-
quisition is costly, liberal (conservative) citizens nd optimal to acquire information
from a media outlet having a liberal (conservative) editor. Consequently, we show
that depending on the distribution of citizensideological preferences, a media outlet
may choose to hire a non-moderate editor even in a monopolistic market. Moreover,
the higher the degree of competition in the market for news, the more likely that
media outlets will hire non-moderate editors. Finally, less moderate editors are
more likely to be hired in a news market where the opportunity cost of acquiring
information for citizens is low.
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1 Introduction
In regulating the market for news in the US, the Federal Communication Commission
pursues three strategic policy goals: competition, diversity and localism.1 Despite the
self-evident importance for democratic decision-making of fostering an e¢ cient market of
information, such policy goals still lack a sound theoretical foundation and an analysis of
their consequences on consumerswelfare and on the optimal media ownerships rules.
This paper is the rst to show the presence of a direct link between competition and
diversity in a market for news where consumers are rational (i.e., they do not derive any
exogenous utility from receiving biased information), they share the same prior beliefs
and media outlets are just prot-maximizers. More specically, our analysis suggests that
a higher degree of competition leads to more viewpoint diversity in the form of having
di¤erent media outlets hiring editors with di¤erent ideological preferences.
We model the market for news as driven by the demand for information of citizens.
More specically, citizens have to choose between two alternative candidates (or policies).
Citizens di¤er in their idiosyncratic preferences but they all equally value the valence
(i.e., quality) of alternative candidates (or public benet of alternative policies). Citizens
may acquire some information about the quality of di¤erent candidates by watching
news reports. News reports are produced by editors hired by media outlets from the
populations of citizens. That is, once hired by a media outlet, a citizen-editor can gather
(costly) information about the candidatesquality and, then, report it to the viewers.
We show that editors with di¤erent idiosyncratic preferences have di¤erent optimal
information acquisition strategies. A moderate editor (i.e., one who is ex-ante indi¤erent
between the two candidates) uses a balanced information acquisition strategy. The
amount of evidence in support of the leftist candidate that she requires in order to stop
collecting information and produce a report in favor of such candidate is the same as
the one she requires to produce a report in favor of the rightist candidate. Instead, a
non-moderate editor acquires information in a slantedway. That is, a small amount of
evidence in support of the leftist candidate is su¢ cient to induce a leftist editor to stop
investing in information acquisition and produce a report in favor of that candidate. On
the other hand, such editor would produce a report in favor of the rightists candidate only
after having collected a large amount of evidence in support of that candidate. Moreover,
the more moderate an editor is the more information, on average, she collects.
In order to access news reports, citizens have to pay an opportunity cost. Hence, in
choosing whether to watch a media outlet report or not and, if so, which of them to
watch, a citizen will take into account two di¤erent components. She will consider how
1Source: http://www.fcc.gov/mediagoals/
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much information the editor of a media outlet may have collected before producing a news
report. At the same time, she will also take into account how pivotal the information
gathered by an editor could be for her nal choice. Suppose, for example, that a liberal
citizen has to decide whether to watch a media outlet having a moderate editor or one
having a liberal editor. This type of citizen knows that the moderate editor is the one
who, on average, will produce a more informative report (i.e., the average amount of
evidence contained in a report is higher). However, such citizen also knows that the
liberal editor is the one who may be more likely to produce a report that will be relevant
for her nal decision. Indeed, a liberal citizen will vote for a conservative candidate
only when the evidence in favor of such candidate is very strong. A liberal editor is
the one who will collect more evidence in support of the conservative candidate before
producing a favorable report. Instead, a report coming from a moderate editor in favor of
the conservative candidate may not contain enough evidence to convince a liberal citizen
to change her ex-ante ranking of preferences over candidates. Hence, a liberal citizen
may nd optimal to acquire information from a media outlet having an editor with
similar idiosyncratic preferences even though such citizen does not have any exogenous
preferences for like-minded sources of information.
Media outlets anticipate this behavior by citizens and hence they choose which editor
to hire taking into account the expected demand for news reports produced by editors
with di¤erent idiosyncratic preferences. That is, by choosing a more leftist, moderate or
rightist editor, media outlets implicitly choose their product location in the political
space. We show that when the distribution of citizens is such that the number of extrem-
ists citizens is higher than the one of moderate citizens, a media outlet may choose to
hire a non-moderate editor even in a monopolistic market. Hence, even though citizens
do not derive any exogenous utility from acquiring biased information and the media
outlet is just maximizing prots, the endogenous acquisition of costly information may
induce a media outlet to choose an editor whose optimal information acquisition strategy
is slantedin favor of the alternative ex-ante preferred by a subset of citizens. This is
true even in the case where all citizens share the same ex-post ranking of preferences over
candidates.
We also show that even in the case where citizens are uniformly distributed in the policy
space, it exists a threshold in the number of media outlets present in the market for news
above which media outlets hire non-moderate editors. More specically, the lower the
opportunity cost of watching news by citizens, the more citizens care about candidates
quality and the lower is the cost of acquiring information by editors, the more likely that
media outlets hire non-moderate editors, for a given number of media outlets present in
the market for news.
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Overall, our results suggest that we should expect more moderate editors to prevail in
news markets where the opportunity cost that citizens have to incur to access information
is high. Indeed, when such opportunity cost is high, the expected benet of watching
news reports for extremist citizens may be lower than the cost. Hence, media outlets will
be more likely to hire moderate editors since the bulk of the demand for news comes from
moderate citizens. Instead, when the opportunity cost is low, even extremist citizens may
nd convenient to watch news reports when such news reports come from an editor with
similar idiosyncratic preferences. Hence, a media outlet may nd optimal to locate
its news product to capture this demand for news by non-moderate citizens (i.e., hire a
non-moderate editor). A clear application of such result is represented by the market
for news in the broadcast media sector with respect to the press. The opportunity cost
of watching a report from a broadcast media is arguably lower than the one of reading
a newspaper. Our analysis thus suggests that we should expect to nd more moderate
editors in the press than in the broadcast media sector. At the same time, we should
expect more extremist citizens watching broadcast media and a higher overall demand
for broadcast media with respect to the one faced by the press.
1.1 Related Literature
A recent empirical literature has shown the presence of systematic bias in the market
for news using a variety of instruments to measure such bias (e.g., Grosenclose and Mi-
lyo 2005, Ho and Quinn 2008, Gentzkow and Shapiro 2009). In parallel, a fast growing
theoretical literature has tried to rationalize the presence of such systematic bias in the
media. This literature has, so far, identied two di¤erent forces creating a bias in media
reports. The rst one is a supply-drivenbias: media bias may be derive from the idio-
syncratic preferences of journalists (Baron 2006), owners (Djankov et al. 2003, Anderson
and McLaren 2007), governments (Besley and Prat 2006) or advertisers (Ellman and Ger-
mano 2008). The second one is a demand-drivenbias. Part of this literature assumes
that consumers like to receive information conrming their bias and thus media just re-
ect and conrm the bias of their audience (Mullainathan and Shleifer 2005, Bernhardt
et al. 2008). On the other hand, Gentzkow and Shapiro (2006) show that even when
consumers do not like biased information, if media outlets have reputation concerns and
there is uncertainty on the quality of media outlets, in presence of heterogeneous prior
beliefs di¤erent media outlets operating in the same market may nd optimal to bias
their reports according to the prior beliefs of di¤erent segments of consumers.2 Finally,
Chan and Suen (2008) show that media bias emerges when media outlets observe the
2See also Burke (2008) for a model of media bias with no reputation concerns and with heterogeneous
prior beliefs.
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state of the world but they are exogenously constrained to report coarse information.
Our model provides a demand-driven rationale for media bias without relying on any
exogenous preferences for biased news conrming individualsbeliefs (as in Mullainathan
and Shleifer 2005), without heterogeneous prior beliefs (as in Gentzkow and Shapiro
2006 and Burke 2008) and without exogenous coarsening of information (as in Chan and
Suen 2008). In our model, the only force behind the individual willingness to acquire
information from a like-minded source is the cost of acquiring information. Our results
are consistent with the empirical results of Gentzkow and Shapiro (2009). Using zip-code
level data on newspaper circulation in the US, they show that the demand for right-wing
newspaper is higher in markets with a higher proportion of Republicans. Moreover, they
nd that ownership has little or no role in media slant.3 Our paper suggests that such
ndings may not be the result of behavioral preferences for biased news but they may
rather be the result of the demand for costly information by rational individuals and the
consequent optimal ideological locationof news by prot maximizing media outlets.4
Formally, our model of optimal acquisition of information by citizen-editors is related
with the one of Brocas and Carrillo (2008) on systematic errors in decision making. In
their setting individuals have to decide how much information they want to collect before
taking an action whose utility depends on the state of the world. Given any exoge-
nous amount of information, all individuals would choose the same action. However, in
presence of endogenous information acquisition di¤erent individuals would have di¤erent
probabilities of choosing a given action. More specically, they show that individuals
favor actions with large payo¤-variance. Our setting di¤ers in that we assume that all
actions have the same variance in payo¤s for any citizen-editor and such variance is equal
across citizen-editors. Moreover, in our model citizen-editors di¤er in their ex-ante rank-
ing of actions even when they share the same ex-post ordinal preferences over actions.5
Our paper is also related to Suen (2004) on the self-perpetuation of biased beliefs.
Suen focuses on a situation where information acquisition is not costly but the presence of
heterogeneous subjective beliefs and coarse information lead to a short-runpolarization
of beliefs. Instead, our setting involves a situation where information is not coarse, people
share the same subjective beliefs but the presence of a cost in information gathering and
heterogeneous idiosyncratic preferences may lead to a long-runpolarization of beliefs.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model and the structure of the
3More specically, they nd that the slant of co-owned papers is only weakly (and statistically
insignicantly) correlated to a newspapers political alignment(Gentzkow and Shapiro, 2009, page 5).
4Calvert (1985) was the rst to point out the positive value of a biased source of information for a
rational decision-maker.
5Notice also that in their model the cost of acquiring information is embedded in the discount factor.
Their results do not apply in presence of a per unit cost of sampling since individuals di¤er only in the
variance of their payo¤s but not in their ex-ante ranking between actions.
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game. Section 3 derives the optimal information acquisition strategy by citizen-editors.
Section 4 discusses the demand for news. Section 5 contains the results on the optimal
choice of editors by media outlets. Section 6 concludes. All the proofs are provided in
the appendix.
2 The Model
2.1 Citizens
There is a continuum of citizens of measure one who have to make a decision regarding
a single issue or policy P . Without loss of generality, we assume the policy space to be
	 = [0; 1]. There are only two possible alternative candidates/policies L and R (i.e.,
P = fL;Rg) where L = 0 and R = 1: There are two possible states of the world s 2
fl; rg ; where the prior probability of the state of the world being s = r is assumed to be
common knowledge and it is denoted by q:
Citizens care about the ideological distance between their idiosyncratic preferences
and the candidatespolicy platforms. That is, citizens want to minimize the euclidean
distance between their policy preferences and the ones of the chosen candidate. At the
same time citizens also care about the valence (i.e., quality) of the candidates. The
valence component is captured by an additive constant in the citizens utility function.
That is, regardless of her idiosyncratic policy preferences, each citizen gets an extra
positive payo¤when she chooses the high valence candidate and a negative one when the
low valence candidate is chosen.6 Hence, citizen is utility function is:
ui(P; xi) = IsIp   jP   xij (1)
where xi represents the idiosyncratic policy preference of citizen i: Moreover,  2 (0; 12 ]
and:
Is =
(
1 if s = l
 1 if s = r and Ip =
(
1 if P = L
 1 if P = R (2)
As a consequence, candidate L gives a higher utility to citizens when the state of the
world is l than when the state is r (viceversa for candidate R).7 In other words, while
L and R represent the alternative political platforms of two candidates, 2 can be seen
6As usual in the literature on the demand for news media (e.g., Mullainathan and Shleifer 2005,
Gentzkow and Shapiro 2006, Chan and Suen 2008) we assume that citizens receive utility from choosing
a given candidate/alternative per se.
7For a similar specication of the voters utility function see, for example, Aragones and Palfrey
(2002).
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as the di¤erence in the valence of the two candidates in each state of the world.8 The
idiosyncratic preferences of citizens are distributed with a common knowledge c.d.f. F (x)
with density function f(x) where supp [f(x)] = [0; 1]. Hence, the state contingent utilities
of citizen i are as follows:
ui(L) =
(
   xi if s = l
    xi if s = r
and ui(R) =
(
  + xi   1 if s = l
 + xi   1 if s = r
(3)
Notice also that for any citizen i the two candidates have the same variance in payo¤s
and such variance is equal across citizens since:
ui(Ljs = l)  ui(Ljs = r) = ui(Rjs = r)  ui(Rjs = l) = 2 8i
Let  = fl; rg be the signal space. The signal likelihood function is as follows:
Pr(ljs = l) = Pr(rjs = r) =  (4)
where  2  1
2
; 1

represents the precision of the signal. Suppose now that citizens receive
nl signals l and nr signals r on the state of the world. Then the citizensposterior
beliefs are:
Pr(s = rjnl; nr) = Pr(nl; nrjs = r) Pr(s = r)
Pr(nl; nrjs = r) Pr(s = r) + Pr(nl; nrjs = l) Pr(s = l)
Thus
Pr(s = rjnl; nr) = q
nr nl
qnr nl + (1  q)(1  )nr nl
Therefore, denoting n = nr   nl we can write the citizensposterior beliefs as:
(n) =
1
1 + 1 q
q
 
1 

n (5)
Hence, citizen i prefers candidate R to candidate L whenever:
(n) >
1
4
(2   2xi + 1) = (n^i) = ^i (6)
That is n^i is the di¤erence in the number of signals in favor of state r which makes citizen
i being indi¤erent between candidates R and L: Notice that for  = 1
2
we always have
8As an alternative interpretation of the model, L and R can be seen as two alternative policies (e.g.
implementing Kyotos protocol or not). Hence, if the state of the world is l then the public benets/cost
ratio of policy L is higher than the one of R (viceversa if s = r). That is, if the state of the world is l
policy L is the most e¢ cient one.
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that ^i > 0. Hence for  =
1
2
all citizens would prefer candidate L when s = l and
candidate R when s = r: That is, when  = 1
2
; ex-post all citizens have the same ranking
of preferences over candidates. Instead, for 0 <  < 1
2
there will be some stubborn
citizens who will always vote for the same candidate regardless of the state of the world.9
Moreover:
@ui(R)
@(n)
=  @ui(L)
@(n)
= 2, 8i
that is, the utility functions of citizens i and j are always parallel. We can thus represent
the utilities of citizens as follows:
0
ui (L)
          ui (R)
|
1 m
 |
imˆ
-1/2
ix-d
1-+ ixd
Figure 1. Utility of citizen i for xi > 1=2
For any exogenously given (n) 2 (0; 1); di¤erent citizens may have di¤erent ranking of
preferences regarding candidates L and R. More specically:
^ 1
2
=
1
2
and
@^i
@xi
< 0 (7)
Thus, citizens with more rightistpreferences require less evidence in favor of R in order
to choose that candidate with respect to moderate citizens. Notice also that:
ui(Lj^i) = ui(Rj^i) =  
1
2
8i
Hence the expected utilities of citizens i and j for xj = 1=2 < xi are as follows:
9Notice that assuming  2 (0; 12 ] is without loss of generality. The same results would hold in a model
where  2 R+ and supp [f(x)] = R:
7
ix-d
2
1
-d
)(
2
1 Lu )(
2
1 Ru
ui (L)
2
10
ui (R)
|
1 m
1-+ ixd
|
imˆ
-1/2
Figure 2. Expected utilities of citizens i and j for xj = 12 < xi
Notice also that when a citizen cares more about the true state of the world (i.e., when the
valence component is larger), her indi¤erence threshold is closer to the one of a moderate
citizen. That is:
@^i
@
=
(2xi   1)
42
(
< 0 if xi < 12
> 0 if xi > 12
(8)
In other words, the more citizens care about the quality of di¤erent candidates, the less
evidence in favor of the least ideologically closer candidate they require in order to vote
for her.
2.2 The Game
There is a media industry composed byK  1 media outlets. We assume that each media
outlet wants to maximize its viewership in order to maximize its advertising revenues. In
order to produce news reports each media outlet has to hire an editor from the population
of citizens. Once hired, the citizen-editor is endowed with a (costly) technology that allows
her to collect evidence on the state of the world. More specically, we assume that an
editor has to incur a cost c any time she decides to get a signal on the state of the world
(e.g., e¤ort she has to exert to acquire information, opportunity cost of sending reporters
to investigate an issue, etc.).10 The media outlet will then produce a news report based
on the editors optimal sampling strategy. Citizens will then decide whether to access a
media outlets report by paying an opportunity cost C or not. If they decide to watch
a media outlets report they update their beliefs using Bayesrule. Hence, the demand
of news reports that a media outlet faces is a function of the type of editor that it has
hired. That is, given an editor with idiosyncratic preferences xe; the prot function of
10By editor we refer to what is usually called Editor-in-Chief for a newspaper and Managing
Editor in the broadcast media sector. More in general, the model applies to the choice of a prot
maximizing media outlet regarding the type of journalists to be hired.
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media outlet k is k(xe) = Dk(xe); where Dk(xe) is the demand for the news report
produced by the media outlet. To avoid the presence of exogenous asymmetries, we focus
on symmetric distribution of citizensidiosyncratic preferences that are monotone in the
sub-intervals x 2 [0; 1
2
] and x 2 [1
2
; 1]:11 To summarize, the timing of the game is as
follows:
Citizens decide whether
to watch a media outlet’s
report and if so, update
their beliefs.
Media outlets choose
their editors from the
population of citizens
Nature draws
state of the
world l or r
Each editor samples
and then produces a
news report
Citizens choose their
preferred candidate.
Payoffs are realized
Figure 3. Timing of the Game
We now turn to the analysis of the optimal strategy of a citizen-editor (i.e., her optimal
sampling strategy). Then we derive the demand of news reports by citizens (i.e., Dk(xe))
as a function of an editors optimal sampling strategy. Finally, we analyze the prot-
maximizing strategy of media outlets (i.e., which type of editor maximizes the prots of
the media outlet) and discuss the results.
3 Optimal Information Acquisition by Citizens-Editors
Suppose that a media outlet has hired a citizen with idiosyncratic preferences xi to work
as its editor. We denote by  i;m(n) the decision of a citizen-editor i given that she has
already drawn m = f0; 1; :::::1g signals and given a current di¤erence of signals in favor
of r equal to n. Given anym and n; the choice set of citizen-editor i is  m(n) = fL;R; dg:
Thus she can choose candidate L or R or she can pay c and draw another signal on the
state of the world (i.e., choose  i;m(n) = d; where d stands for draw).
Hence, an editor faces a trade-o¤ between the cost of acquiring a signal and the utility
she gets from the informative content of each signal. Her problem is thus to nd an
optimal stopping rule. More specically, the value function that editor i maximizes after
m draws; given a current di¤erence of signals in favor of state r equal to n; is the following:
Vi(n) =
8>>>>>>><>>>>>>>:
max
8<: (1  2(n))  xi;v(n)Vi(n+ 1) + (1  v(n))Vi(n  1)  c
9=; if (n) < ^i
max
8<: (2(n)  1)  (1  xi);v(n)Vi(n+ 1) + (1  v(n))Vi(n  1)  c
9=; if (n)  ^i
(9)
11For example, the families of Uniform, Normal, and Cauchy distribution functions satisfy such prop-
erty.
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where v(n) = (n) + (1   (n))(1   ): In other words, if after m draws editor i has
a posterior (n) < ^i she will choose between alternative L with an expected payo¤ of
(1 (n)) (   xi)+(n)(  xi) or paying c and getting another signal. In this case, with
probability v the editor will get signal r in which case the value function becomes Vi(n+1)
and with probability (1 v) she will get signal l in which case the value function becomes
Vi(n   1): Viceversa, if after m draws editor i has a posterior (n)  ^i she will choose
between alternative R with an expected payo¤ of (1 (n)) (xi      1)+(n)(xi+ 1)
or paying c and getting another signal. In this case, with probability v the editor will get
signal r in which case the value function becomes Vi(n+1) and with probability (1  v)
she will get signal l in which case the value function becomes Vi(n   1): Notice also
that the value function of editor i does not depend on how many draws she has already
done (i.e., m), since the only relevant variable for her decision is the current di¤erence of
signals in favor of r (i.e., n):
The following Proposition characterizes the properties of the optimal information ac-
quisition strategy by an editor.
Proposition 1 For all c > 0, there exist (ni ; n

i ) such that for 8m; 8i:
1.  i;m(n) = L if n < ni ;  i;m(n) = R if n > n

i and  i;m(n) = d if n 2 (ni ; ni ):
2. @n

i
@xi
< 0;
@ni
@
< 0 and @n

i
@c
> 0
3. @n

i
@xi
< 0;
@ni
@
> 0 and @n

i
@c
< 0
Moreover @ni@xi

8>>><>>>:
<
@ni@xi  for xi < 12
=
@ni@xi  for xi = 12
>
@ni@xi  for xi > 12
and @ni@

8>>><>>>:
<
@ni@  for xi < 12
=
@ni@  for xi = 12
>
@ni@  for xi > 12
;
@ni@c

8>>><>>>:
<
@ni@c  for xi < 12
=
@ni@c  for xi = 12
>
@ni@c  for xi > 12
Proof. See Appendix.
The following graph illustrates the optimal strategy of editor i after m draws, given a
current di¤erence of signals in favor of r equal to n:
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Figure 4. Optimal Strategy of editor i
In other words, ni is the threshold below which editor i does not sample anymore and
reports jni j more signals in favor of candidate L: Similarly, ni is the threshold above
which editor i does not sample anymore and reports ni more signals in favor of candidate
R:
For any given n a more rightisteditor is always more likely to produce a report in
favor of candidate R than in favor of L; with respect to a more leftist editor. Thus
xi > xj implies that ni < n

j and n

i < n

j : Moreover, given editors j and i with xj < xi <
1
2
; then nj   nj < ni   ni : That is, a leftist editor requires even less signal in favor of L
than more in favor of R to stop sampling, with respect to a moderate editor. Similarly,
given editors j and i with xj > xi > 12 ; then n

j   nj < ni   ni : That is, a rightist editor
requires even less signal in favor of R than more in favor of L with respect to a moderate
editor. Hence, the more moderate an editor is, the larger is her information acquisition
setNi = fnj i;m(n) = dg (i.e., the set of the di¤erence in the number of signals in favor
of r (or in favor of l) such that editor i will keep sampling).12 At the same time, an
increase in the importance of the valence component of the editors utility function ()
makes an editor sample more in both directions (i.e., Ni becomes larger). Moreover, an
increase in  induces a leftist editor to increase her leftiststopping rule more than her
rightist stopping rule (i.e., jni j increases more than ni ). The opposite is true for a
rightist editor. That is, a higher  is associated with more sampling in both directions
and a more symmetric stopping rule for all types of editors. Finally, when the cost of each
signal is higher, it is optimal for each editor to make her mindsooner (i.e., Ni shrinks).
Moreover, when c is larger the stopping rule of each editor is also more asymmetric.
Hence, when information acquisition is more costly, each editor nds optimal to devote
more resources in acquiring information in the direction that could change her ex-ante
decision(i.e., in the direction of persuading her not to vote for the ideologically closer
candidate).
Therefore, proposition 1 suggests that when  is higher and c is lower we should expect
any type of editor: i) to acquire more information; ii) to behave as if she were more
moderate (i.e., to have more symmetric stopping rules).
Notice that, for xi = 12 ; n

i   n^i = n^i   ni and thus (ni ) = 1   (ni ): Moreover for
12Notice that it is always the case that either Ni  ? or Ni  fni ; ni + 1; ::::::; ni   1; ni g  f0g :
11
xi > xj:
(ni ) < (n

j) < q < (n

i ) < (n

j) (10)
Moreover, given the comparative statics results of Proposition 1, we can directly derive
some comparative statics results on the probability of choosing the wrongcandidate.
Corollary 1
@ Pr( i(n)=Ljs=r)
@c
> 0 and @ Pr( i(n)=Rjs=l)
@c
> 0
@ Pr( i(n)=Ljs=r)
@
< 0 and @ Pr( i(n)=Rjs=l)
@
< 0
@ Pr( i(n)=Ljs=r)
@xi
< 0 and @ Pr( i(n)=Rjs=l)
@xi
> 0
Moreover, the more moderate an editor is, the lower is her overall probability of making
errors.
Thus as expected, when the cost of sampling is higher editors will make more errors
in the sense that they would be less likely to choose the high valence candidate. Viceversa,
when editors care more about the quality of candidates their probability of mistakenly
choosing the low quality candidate decreases (since as shown by proposition 1, when 
is higher editors acquire more information). On the other hand, more rightisteditors
are less likely to choose candidate L when the high quality one is R and are instead more
likely to choose candidate R when the high quality one is L: However, overall, moderate
editors are less likely to make a report in favor of the low quality candidate. This is
due to the fact that, as shown by proposition 1, the more moderate an editor is, the
more symmetric her sampling strategy is and also the more information she acquires
before making a decision. Therefore, by taking on average a more informeddecision,
moderate editors are less likely to choose the low quality candidate.
For ease of notation, from now on we will denote the idiosyncratic preferences of an
editor xe and, thus, her optimal stopping rules as (ne; n

e). Next section analyzes the
demand by citizens for the news reports of a media outlet as a function of the optimal
stopping rules of its editor.
4 The Demand for News
In the previous section we have derived the optimal sampling strategy of an editor as a
function of her idiosyncratic preferences. Moreover, given the idiosyncratic preferences
of a media outlets editor, each citizen i can infer the set of possible reports of a media
outlet (i.e., citizen i knows that the editor will either stop acquiring information after
having collected ne signals in favor of L or n

e in favor of R): Let the citizensaction space
be A = fW;NWg where W stands for watch the news reports and NW for not watching
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the news reports. Then, the expected utility of citizen i from not getting any news report
from the media outlet is:
Ui(NW ) = max fUi(Ljq);Ui(Rjq)g
that is for q = 1
2
:
Ui(NW ) =
(
Ui
 
Lj1
2

for xi < 12
Ui
 
Rj1
2

for xi > 12
If instead citizen i decides to pay a cost C to access the news reports, her expected utility
will be:
Ui(W ) = Pr(n = n

e)max fUi (Lj(ne)) ;Ui (Rj(ne))g
+ Pr(n = ne)max fUi (Lj(ne)) ;Ui (Rj(ne))g   C
(11)
Where:13
Pr(n = ne) =
2(ne)  1
2 [(ne)  (ne)]
(12)
and
Pr(n = ne) =
1  2(ne)
2 [(ne)  (ne)]
(13)
Lets now focus on the marginal viewer. That is, the viewer who is indi¤erent between
watching and not watching the media outlets reports. More specically, there will be
two marginal viewers. One representing the most rightist citizen willing to watch news
reports from a media outlet having an editor with idiosyncratic preferences xe: The other
one representing the most leftist citizen willing to watch such news reports. That is,
there will be a x^e = x^e(xe) and a ~xe = ~xe(xe) with x^e < ~xe such that only citizens with
xi 2 [x^e; ~xe] will watch the news reports.14
Lets start analyzing the marginal viewer for xi < 12 : Then Ui(NW ) = Ui
 
Lj1
2

and
since by (10) ne < 0 < n

e; it must be the case that:
Ui (Lj(ne)) > Ui (Rj(ne))
Moreover, the following individual rationality constraint must be satised for leftist citi-
zens:
Ui (Lj(ne)) < Ui (Rj(ne)) (IRL)
otherwise, if Ui (Lj(ne)) > Ui (Rj(ne)) (i.e., if citizen i would always prefer alternative
L regardless of watching or not the news reports) then watching the news reports would
13These are simply the probabilities of hitting the two stopping thresholds in a stochastic process with
two absorbing states. See Brocas and Carrillo (2007) for an analogous derivation.
14Notice that it could also be the case that x^e > 12 or ~xe <
1
2 but not both.
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not be ex-post rational given the cost C: Thus the marginal leftist viewer will be the one
having idiosyncratic preferences x^e such that:
Ui

Lj1
2

=
2(ne)  1
2 [(ne)  (ne)]
Ui (Lj(ne)) +
1  2(ne)
2 [(ne)  (ne)]
Ui (Rj(ne))  C
that is:
x^e =
1
2
  (2(ne)  1) +
C
2Pr(n = ne)
(14)
Notice also that the ex-post rationality constraint (IRL) is satised as long as x > 12  
(2(ne)  1) = xMin: Hence, since x^e > xMin, such constraint is automatically satised
for any citizen willing to watch the news reports.
Lets now focus on the marginal viewer for xi > 12 : Then Ui(NW ) = Ui
 
Rj1
2

and since
by (10) ne < 0 < n

e; it must be the case that:
Ui (Rj(ne)) > Ui

Rj1
2

Moreover, the following individual rationality constraint must be satised for rightist
citizens:
Ui (Lj(ne)) > Ui (Rj(ne)) (IRR)
otherwise, if Ui (Lj(ne)) < Ui (Rj(ne)) (i.e., if citizen i would always prefer alternative
R regardless of watching or not the news reports) then watching the news reports would
not be ex-post rational given the cost C: Thus the marginal rightist viewer will be the
one having idiosyncratic preferences ~xe such that:
Ui

Rj1
2

=
2(ne)  1
2 [(ne)  (ne)]
Ui (Lj(ne)) +
1  2(ne)
2 [(ne)  (ne)]
Ui (Rj(ne))  C
that is:
~xe =
1
2
+ (1  2(ne)) 
C
2Pr(n = ne)
(15)
Notice also that the ex-post rationality constraint (IRR) is satised as long as x <
1
2
+ (1   2(ne)) = xMax: Hence, since ~xe < xMax, such constraint is automatically
satised for any citizen willing to watch the news reports. We now introduce the following
assumption:
Assumption 1
C < CMAX = 
 
1   ne jxe=12
1 + 
ne jxe=12
!
It is easy to prove that when this assumption does not hold and C > CMAX , there will
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never be any leftist or rightist citizen willing to watch any news report.15 The following
Lemma contains the main properties of the demand for news.
Lemma 1 Let (ne; n

e) the optimal stopping rules of an editor with idiosyncratic prefer-
ences xe:Then:
i) @x^e
@C
> 0; @~xe
@C
< 0
ii) @x^e
@
< 0; @~xe
@
> 0
iii) @x^e
@ Pr(n=ne)
< 0; @~xe
@ Pr(n=ne)
> 0
iv) @x^e
@ne
> 0; @~xe
@ne
< 0
v) @x^e
@ne
< 0; @~xe
@ne
> 0
vi)
@ Pr(n=ne)
@xe
=  @ Pr(n=ne)
@xe
< 0
Lets now discuss the meaning of these results. Obviously, a higher opportunity cost
of watching news reports decreases the number of leftist and rightist citizens willing to
watch such reports. Viceversa, the higher is the valence component in the citizens utility
function, the more leftist and rightist citizens will want to watch news. That is the more
citizens care about knowing the state of the world, the more citizens will get informed.
On the other hand, the number of leftist citizens watching news reports is an increasing
function of the probability of an editor hittingthe rightist threshold. That is, the more
likely that the information collected by an editor will be pivotal in the leftist citizens
decision, the more leftist citizens will be willing to watch the media outlets reports (a
symmetric intuition holds for rightist citizens). Notice also that all citizens care about
receiving the most accurate information. Indeed, the lower is ne and the higher is n

e; the
more citizens will want to get informed. On the other hand, as expected, a more rightist
editor has a lower probability of hitting the leftist thresholdand a higher probability
of hitting the rightist threshold.
Hence, the above lemma summarizes the main features of the demand for news media
by citizens. All citizens who value information (i.e., the ones whose ex-post ranking of
candidates is not always the same as their ex-ante one) would like to watch a news media
outlet having an editor who samples in both directions until innity, since the more
15Notice that we have chosen CMAX = CMAX

xe=
1
2
since CMAX

xe 6= 12
= 

n

e 1

1 ne

n

e ne and
dCMAX j
xe 6=12
dxe
8<: > 0 for xi <
1
2
= 0 for xi = 12
< 0 for xi > 12
hence assuming that C < CMAX

xe=
1
2
is the least restrictive assump-
tion. Notice also that @C
Max
@ > 0 and
@CMax
@ne
> 0:
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information she gets, the higher the citizensexpected utility. However, given the cost
of acquiring information for an editor and the opportunity cost that each citizen faces
when accessing this information, when a citizen is choosing whether to watch a media
outlet and/or choosing among alternative news media outlets, she takes into account
two di¤erent components. That is, she considers how similar an editors idiosyncratic
preferences are to hers (i.e., how much valuablethe information provided by an editor
could be to her) but she also values the intensityof information acquisition by an editor
(i.e., how much information an editor is acquiring and thus providing, on average).
More specically, citizens can be divided into two categories depending on their idiosyn-
cratic preferences. Citizens with preferences xi < x^ejxe= 12 and xi > ~xejxe= 12 are relatively
extremists.16 For these citizens only a media outlet with an editor with similar idio-
syncratic preferences can be pivotal for their choice (i.e., they never nd valuable the
information coming from a moderate editor). Hence, either they will watch a media out-
let with an editor with (su¢ ciently) similar preferences or they will not watch any media
outlet at all.
On the other hand, citizens with preferences x^ejxe= 12 < xi < ~xejxe= 12 are relatively
moderate(i.e., liberal-moderates for x^ejxe= 12 < xi <
1
2
and conservative-moderates for
1
2
< xi < ~xejxe= 12 ): These citizens nd valuable the information coming from a moderate
editor but they may nd even more valuable the information coming from an editor with
similar idiosyncratic preferences. More specically, each citizen faces a basic trade-o¤
between the amount and the value of information coming from di¤erent types of
editors. A citizen can make two specular errors. She may choose L when L is the low
quality candidate. Similarly, she may choose R when R is the low quality candidate. A
moderate citizen (i.e., xi = 12) cares about these two errors equally. Hence, she always
prefers to watch a media outlet having a moderate editor since such editor minimizes
the overall probability of making errors (see Corollary 1). On the other hand, a liberal-
moderate citizen cares more about not making the error of choosing R when s = l: As
we have seen in Corollary 1, a liberal editor has a lower probability of making such error
but a higher probability of making a report in favor of L when s = r and a higher
overall probability of making errors. Hence, when choosing between a media outlet with
a moderate editor and one with a liberal editor, a liberal-moderate citizen will trade-o¤
the amount and the value of information provided by di¤erent types of editors.17
The following section analyzes what are the implications of such demand for news for
16Notice that not all these citizens can be properly dened as extremistssince not everyone of them
is stubborn. Some of them may change their ex-ante ranking of preferences over candidates if they
receive enough information in favor of the ideologically least preferred candidate (notice that for  = 12
everyone would do so upon knowing the true state of the world).
17Durante and Knight (2009) analyze the demand of news in Italy. They show that, indeed, when the
ideological position of a media outlet changes, viewers change their choice of news programs accordingly.
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the optimal choice of editors by prot maximizing media outlets.
5 Optimal Choice of Editors by Media
5.1 Monopoly
We want now to analyze the implications of such citizens-editors model in a monopolistic
market. The media outlets owner wants to choose xe to maximize viewership. Choosing
an editor from the population of citizens is analogous to choosing a product location
on the [0; 1] line. Suppose the media outlets owner chooses an editor with idiosyncratic
preferences xe: Then, the prot function is:
(xe; x^e; ~xe) = F (~xe)  F (x^e)
Hence, the media outlet owner will choose an editor with preferences xMone such that:
@D(xe)
@xe

xe=xMone
= 0
where F (~xe) and F (x^e) are increasing functions of xe: The following proposition char-
acterizes under which conditions a prot-maximizing media outlet will hire a moderate
editor and under which conditions it will hire a non-moderate one.
Proposition 2 Suppose there is just a monopolist media outlet in the market for news.
Then,
1. If
@f(xi)
@xi
8<:  0 for xi <
1
2
 0 for xi > 12
(16)
then the media outlet will always hire a moderate editor (i.e., xMone =
1
2
).
2. If
@f(xi)
@xi
8<: < 0 for xi <
1
2
> 0 for xi > 12
(17)
then the media outlet will always hire a non moderate editor with preferences xMoneR >
1
2
(or, equivalently, one with preferences xMoneL = 1  xMoneR < 12). However, even in
this case there is an upper bound on the extremismof the optimal editor. That is
17
9 ~C < CMax with @ ~C
@xe
8<: > 0 for xe <
1
2
< 0 for xe > 12
such that xMoneR 2 (12 ; xR] where xR is such
that:
~x(xeR) = ~x

~C

xR
= C

The above proposition is showing that a monopolist media outlet will always choose a
moderate editor when citizens are distributed uniformly or when the mass of moderate
citizens is higher than the one of extremists ones. Instead, if the number of moder-
ate citizens is lower than the one of extremists, the media outlet will prefer to hire a
non-moderate editor. Hence, even though citizens do not derive any exogenous utility
from acquiring biased information and the media outlet is just maximizing prots, the
endogenous acquisition of costly information may induce a media outlet to choose an edi-
tor whose optimal information acquisition strategy is slantedin favor of the alternative
ex-ante preferred by a subset of citizens (e.g., the rightists one). Moreover, non-moderate
citizens may prefer to face a media outlet having an editor with this kind of slant in in-
formation acquisition rather than facing a moderate one (even when all citizens share the
same ex-post preferences over candidates, i.e., when  = 1
2
).
However, even in this case the optimal editor will not be too extremist. Less moderate
citizens will indeed trade-o¤ the benet of having an editor with similar preferences
and the cost of having an editor who will sample relatively less. Hence choosing a less
moderate editor, after some point, will decrease the number of rightistcitizens willing
to watch the media outlet (i.e., for xe > xR):
5.2 Duopoly
Suppose now that K = 2: That is, the market for news is composed by two prot maxi-
mizing media outlets. The following proposition summarizes the possible Nash equilibria
that can arise in this case depending on the distribution of citizenspreferences.
Proposition 3 Suppose there are two media outlets in the market for news. Then:
1. If (16) is satised, then both media outlet will hire moderate editors (i.e., xe1 =
xe2 =
1
2
).
2. If (17) is satised then 9CDev < CMax such that:
(a) If C > CDev;then both media outlet will hire moderate editors (i.e., xe1 = xe2 =
1
2
)
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(b) If C < CDev; then the two media outlets will hire non-moderate editors having
symmetric idiosyncratic preferences (i.e., xe1 = 1   xe2 6= 12): Moreover, the
lower is C; the less moderate editors will be hired in equilibrium.
When (16) holds, despite the fact that by choosing, for example, a rightist editor a
media outlet would increase the number of rightist citizens willing to watch its news (i.e.,
higher marginal rightist viewer), the net e¤ect on the demand of choosing this editor
rather than a moderate one would be always negative. Since choosing a less moderate
editor also implies choosing an editor who will sample relatively less with respect to
a more moderate one, the negative e¤ect on moderate citizens viewership would be
higher than the positive e¤ect on rightist citizensviewership. Hence, while in a standard
Hotelling model of product di¤erentiation, the two rms would locate symmetrically so
to capture all the market, in our setting the fact that di¤erent editors have di¤erent
sampling strategies in terms of the degree of asymmetry between them (which would
correspond to the product location on the classical Hotelling line) but also with regard
to the intensityof sampling, prevents such equilibrium to emerge. Hence, the portion
of market covered in a duopoly will still be the same as the one of a monopoly.
Moreover, even when (17) holds, if the opportunity cost of acquiring information is high
with respect to the mass of non moderate citizens, the two media outlets will both choose
moderate editors. This is the only case where a media outlet may not nd convenient to
choose a non-moderate editor in a duopoly while it would so in a monopoly. The reason
behind this di¤erence is that in the monopoly case choosing, for example, a rightist
editor instead of a moderate one will decrease the demand of news by leftist citizens in a
lower proportion with respect to the increase in the demand of news by rightist citizens.
Instead, in the duopoly case, when the opportunity cost of acquiring information is high,
by choosing a rightist editor, a media outlet may face a reduction in the demand for its
news by moderate citizens larger than the increase in the demand by rightist citizens.
On the other hand, when the opportunity cost is low and/or the mass of extremists
citizens is large, the demand of news by extremist citizens will be bigger. Hence, the two
media outlets will choose specular types of non-moderate editors. That is, while in the
monopolistic case there was only a rightist (or leftist) editor, in presence of two media
outlets there will be also a leftist (or rightist) editor.
5.3 Multiple Media Outlets
We now analyze the case where there are multiple media outlets, i.e., K > 2: The above
analysis has shown that when citizenspreferences are distributed uniformly in the policy
space, in a duopoly both media outlets will hire moderate editors. The following propo-
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sition shows that this is not always the case when there are multiple media outlets in the
market for news. More specically, as the number of media outlets present in the mar-
ket increases, the equilibrium where every media outlet chooses a moderate editor is not
sustainable anymore. Indeed, any media outlet would have an incentive to di¤erentiate
its news productby choosing a non-moderate editor.
Proposition 4 Suppose that citizens idiosyncratic preferences are distributed uniformly
in [0; 1]:Then, 9K 2 (2;1) such that for K > K the set xej = 12 ;8j = 1; :::; K	 is not
anymore an equilibrium. In such case, it will still exist a symmetric mixed-strategy Nash
equilibrium. Moreover, if  > 2
3
:
i) dK

d
< 0
ii) dK

dc
> 0
iii) dK

dC
> 0
The above proposition shows that when the market for moderate newsgets crowded,
media outlets will prefer to choose a di¤erent location for their news product.18 When
citizens care more about the quality of candidates, it is more likely that media outlet
will hire non-moderate editors. This result, which may appear counter-intuitive, is due
to the fact that a higher  is associated with more extremists citizens willing to acquire
information. Hence, since in presence of a higher  there is a higher demand for news by
extremists citizens media outlets have higher incentives to choose non-moderate editors.
Moreover, since when c is low ne and jnej are high; when all media outlets choose a
moderate editor (i.e., xje =
1
2
;8j) the overall demand for news is high: Hence, there would
also be a larger market to be stolenby choosing a non-moderate editor. Hence K is
low when c is low. Instead, when c is high, a less moderate editor may not collect enough
information to convince extremists citizen that is worth spending the opportunity cost of
watching the media outlet. Hence, choosing a less moderate editor may lead to a small
gain in the viewership of extremists citizens and a big loss in the viewership of moderate
ones.
On the other hand, since the higher the opportunity cost of acquiring information, the
less extremists citizens will nd optimal to acquire information, as such cost increases
the likelihood of media outlets choosing non-moderate editors decreases.19 That is, we
can also reinterpret the above proposition with respect to C: That is, for a given K > 2;
18Chan and Suen (2008) also consider a model of rational consumers and prot-maximizing media
outlets. However, in their model more competition does not produce di¤erent editorial positions.
19Indeed lim
C!CMax
K !1:
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there will exist a C(K) such that for C > C(K); all media outlets will hire a moderate
editor from the population of citizens. Instead, for C < C(K); media outlets will hire
non-moderate editors. This result, along with the ones of propositions 2 and 3, suggests
that we should expect more moderate editors to prevail in a news market where the
opportunity cost is high. A clear application of such result is thus given by the market
for news in the broadcast media sector with respect to the press. The opportunity cost
of watching a report from a broadcast media is arguably lower than the one of reading
a newspaper. Our analysis thus suggests that we should expect to nd more moderate
editors in the press than in the broadcast media sector. At the same time, we should
expect more extremist citizens watching broadcast media and a higher overall demand
for broadcast media with respect to the one faced by the press.
6 Conclusions
We have analyzed a market for news in which prot maximizing media outlets hire their
editors from the population of citizens. We have shown that when information acqui-
sition by editors is costly and when citizens have to incur in an opportunity cost to
access information, citizens may nd optimal to acquire information from a like-minded
source of information (i.e., from a media outlet having an editor with similar idiosyn-
cratic preferences). Consequently, a prot maximizing media outlet may prefer to hire a
non-moderate editor in order to capture the demand for news of non-moderate citizens.
Hence, even though citizens do not derive any exogenous utility from acquiring biased
information and the media outlet is just maximizing prots, the endogenous acquisition
of costly information may induce a media outlet to choose an editor whose optimal in-
formation acquisition strategy is slanted in favor of the alternative ex-ante preferred
by a subset of citizens. Moreover, the higher the degree of competition in the market
for news, the more likely that media outlets may hire non-moderate editors. That is,
when the market for news gets crowded, rather than sharing the demand for news of
moderate citizens with the other media outlets, a media outlet may prefer to di¤erentiate
its news product by choosing a di¤erent location in the policy space (i.e., hire an editor
with di¤erent idiosyncratic characteristics). Hence, our model provides a rationale for
the presence of media bias purely based on the citizensdemand for the most valuable
source of information. Thus, even though competition brings more media bias in our
model (i.e., non-moderate editors), it still has a positive e¤ect on citizenswelfare since
it allows a higher portion of population to get informed.20
20Notice, however, that in a repeated game the e¤ect of competition on welfare is more subtle. The
short run polarization of beliefs is going to reinforce the demand for news coming from like-minded sources
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Our results also point out that in a market where there is a high opportunity cost of
acquiring information, there will be a lower demand for news by non-moderate citizens.
Thus, we should expect more moderate editors to be hired by media outlets in such
market with respect to a market where the opportunity cost of acquiring information is
low. We think that a natural application of this result lies in the di¤erences between
the broadcast media industry and the press. According to our model, we should observe
more moderate editors in the press sector with respect to the broadcast media sector.
Moreover, broadcast media outlets should face a higher demand from extremist citizens
(and a higher demand overall) with respect to the one faced by the press.
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7 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
The problem involves analyzing a stochastic process with two absorbing state. More specically
we want to determine the equations characterizing these two absorbing states (i.e., ni and n

i ):
After m draws, given that a current di¤erence in signals in favor of r equal to n; the value
function of editor i is given by (9).
First, suppose that the state of the world s = r: Then at a given point in time, given a di¤erence
in signals in favor of r equal to n; the value function of an editor with idiosyncratic preferences
xi will satisfy the following second order di¤erence equation:
V ri (n) = V
r
i (n+ 1) + (1  )V ri (n  1)  c
where the associated homogenous equation is:
y2   y + (1  ) = 0
whose solutions are:
y1 = 1; y2 =
1  

Moreover, since the di¤erence equation is non-homogenous it has also a specic solution of the
form V ri (n) = Hn; thus we should also nd a solution of:
[H(n+ 1) H(n) + (1  )H(n  1)] = c
Thus H = c2 1 : Hence, the generic solution to this second order equation is:
V ri (n) = a+ b
n +Hn
where  = 1  : In order to nd the values of a and b we should consider the two terminal
conditions given stopping rule ni and ni:
V ri (ni) = (2(ni)  1)  (1  xi) (18)
V ri (ni) = (1  2(ni))  xi (19)
that is (18) represents the utility of editor i when reaching ni signals in favor of state r (where
she chooses alternative R): Similarly (19) represents the utility of editor i when reaching jnij
signals in favor of state l (where she chooses alternative L): Thus, given these two terminal
conditions we have that:
a+ bni +Hni = 
1  ni
1 + ni
  (1  xi)
a+ bni +Hni = 
ni   1
1 + ni
  xi
where (n) = 11+n : Thus:
V ri (n; ni; ni) = 

1  ni
1 + ni

  (1  xi) + (
n   ni)
(ni   ni)"
2
 
nini   1
(1 + ni)
 
1 + ni
!+H(ni   ni) + 1  2xi
#
 H(ni   n)
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Similarly, supposing that the state of the world s = l; we can derive V li (n; ni; ni) :
V li (n; ni; ni) = 
1  ni
1 + ni
  (1  xi) +
ni
 
ni   n
n
 
ni   ni"
2
1  nini 
1 + ni

(1 + ni)
+H(ni   ni)  1 + 2xi
#
+H(ni   n)
Thus the expected value of editor i givena di¤erence of signals in favor of r equal to n is:
Vi(n; ni; ni) =
1
1 + n
V ri (n; ni; ni) +
n
1 + n
V li (n; ni; ni) (20)
Therefore, the optimal rightiststopping rule ni will be the value such that
@Vi
@ni
jni = 0; that
is:
@Vi
@ni
jni =
1
1 + n
@V ri
@ni
jni +
n
1 + n
@V li
@ni
jni = 0
similarly, the optimal leftiststopping rule ni will be the value such that
@Vi
@ni
jni = 0; that is:
@Vi
@ni
jn=ni =
1
1 + n
@V ri
@ni
jni +
n
1 + n
@V li
@ni
jni = 0
Where it must be always the case that ni < 0 and n

i > 0.
21 Hence ni is dened implicitly by
the following equation:
(ln)n

i
n

i   ni
h
(2x  1) (1 + ni )  2(ni   1) +H (ni   ni ) (n

i   1)
i
= H

1  ni

(21)
similarly ni is dened implicitly by the following equation:
(ln)n

i
n

i   ni
h
(2x  1)

n

i + 1

+ 2

1  ni

 H (ni   ni )

1  ni
i
=  H

n

i   1

(22)
Notice that the optimal stopping rule ni and n

i do not depend on n: That is the optimal
stopping rule do not change depending on the realization of the signals.22 Lets now analyze
the comparative statics:
@ni
@xi
/ @
2Vi
@ni@xi

ni ;n

i
= 2 (ln)n

i
n

i + 1 
n

i   ni   1  ni  < 0 (23)
Since

n

i   ni

> 0 and ln < 0: Similarly:
@ni
@xi
/ @
2Vi
@ni@xi

ni ;n

i
= 2 (ln)
n

i
n

i   1
n

i + 1
n

i   ni < 0 (24)
21Suppose not. That is n
¯

i > 0: Thus  (n¯

i ) >  (n = 0) = p: If xi >
1
2 ; this would imply that
 (n
¯

i ) > ^i and thus  i(n¯

i ) = R which contradicts the denition of n¯

i : If xi <
1
2 ; then since n = 0 < n¯

i ;
this implies that  i(n = 0) = L and thus the voter would never start sampling. A similar proof applies
to show that ni > 0:
22A detailed formal derivation of the second order conditions, ensuring that (ni ; n

i ) is a global maxi-
mum, is available upon request to the author.
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Therefore
@ni@xi  > @ni@xi  if and only if:
  2 (ln)
n

i   ni
 
(n

i n

i   1)(ni + ni ) 
n

i   1  1  ni 
!
> 0
Therefore since:
(n

i n

i   1)
8<:
< 0 for xi < 12
= 0 for xi = 12
> 0 for xi > 12
(25)
Then: @ni@xi

8>>><>>>:
<
@ni@xi  for xi < 12
=
@ni@xi  for xi = 12
>
@ni@xi  for xi > 12
(26)
since for xi < 12 ; n

i > jni j and thus in our notation ni > jni j and hence n

i n

i < 1; instead
for xi = 12 ; n

i = jni j and thus in our notation ni = jni j and hence n

i n

i = 1: Similarly for
xi >
1
2 ; n

i < jni j and thus in our notation ni < jni j and hence n

i n

i > 1: Lets now analyze
the comparative statics w.r.t. 
@ni
@
/ @
2Vi
@ni@

ni ;n

i
=  2 (ln)ni 
ni   1 
n

i   ni   1  ni  > 0 (27)
Similarly:
@ni
@
/ @
2Vi
@ni@

ni ;n

i
=  2 (ln)ni 1  
ni
(n

i   ni )(1  ni ) < 0 (28)
That is the higher is ; the more citizens care about knowing the true state of the world and
the more they will sample in both directions. Therefore @
2Vi
@ni@

ni ;n

i
> @
2Vi
@ni@

ni ;n

i
if and only if:
2
  ln 
n

i   1  1  ni 

n

i n

i   1

> 0
Hence given (25) then:
@ni
@
8>>><>>>:
<
@ni@  for xi < 12
=
@ni@  for xi = 12
>
@ni@  for xi > 12
(29)
Lets now analyze the comparative statics w.r.t. c: That is, @n

i
@c / @
2Vi
@ni@c

ni ;n

i
:
@2Vi
@ni@c

ni ;n

i
=
1
2   1
"
(ln)n

i (ni   ni )
n

i   1 
n

i   ni   1  ni    1
#
< 0 (30)
Similarly @n

i
@c / @
2Vi
@ni@c

ni ;n

i
@2Vi
@ni@c

ni ;n

i
=
1
2   1(1 + (ln)
ni
ni   ni
n

i   1
n

i   1 
n

i   ni ) > 0 (31)
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Therefore @
2Vi
@ni@c

ni ;n

i
> @
2Vi
@ni@c

ni ;n

i
if and only if:
(n

i n

i   1)

n

i   ni

 
n

i   1  1  ni  < 0
Hence: @ni@c

8>>><>>>:
<
@ni@c  for xi < 12
=
@ni@c  for xi = 12
>
@ni@c  for xi > 12
Q.E.D.
Proof of Corollary 1
@ Pr( i(n)=Ljs=r)
@c > 0,
@ Pr( i(n)=Rjs=l)
@c > 0,
@ Pr( i(n)=Ljs=r)
@xi
< 0,@ Pr( i(n)=Rjs=l)@xi > 0,
@ Pr( i(n)=Ljs=r)
@ <
0 and @ Pr( i(n)=Rjs=l)@ < 0; simply follows from the comparative statics results of Proposition
1. We want instead to show that more moderate citizens have a lower probability of making
errors. Using the same methodology of Lemma 1 in Brocas and Carrillo (2007) we can derive
the probability of choosing the wrong alternative for a given state of the world, that is:
Pr( i(n) = Ljs = r) = Pr(hitting ni jr) =
2(ni )  1
(ni )  (ni )
(ni )
Pr( i(n) = Rjs = l) = Pr(hitting ni jl) =
1  2(ni )
(ni )  (ni )
[1  (ni )]
Thus the ex-ante probability of making an error is:
Pr(error) = Pr(s = r) Pr( i(n) = Ljs = r) + Pr(s = l) Pr( i(n) = Rjs = l)
that is:
Pr(error) =
n

i (n

i   1) + (1  ni )
2
 
n

i   ni 
Hence:
dPr(error)
dxi
=
@ Pr(error)
@ni
@ni
@xi
+
@ Pr(error)
@ni
@ni
@xi
where
@ Pr(error)
@ni
=
1
2
(ln)n

i

n

i   1
2
 
n

i   ni 2 < 0
@ Pr(error)
@ni
=  1
2
(ln)n

i

1  ni
2
 
n

i   ni 2 > 0
hence given (23) and (24):
@ Pr(error)
@xi
=
(ln)2 (n

i n

i   1)
h
n

i

2n

i   ni

(n

i   1) + ni

n

i   2ni

(1  ni )
i
 
n

i   1  1  ni   ni   ni 3
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Hence given (25) then:
@ Pr(error)
@xi
8<:
< 0 for xi < 12
= 0 for xi = 12
> 0 for xi > 12
Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 1
It is immediate to verify i); ii) and iii): Lets focus on iv): Notice that @x^e@(ne) = C(
(2(ne) 1)
(1 2(ne))2 ) >
0. On the other hand, @~xe@(ne) =  2 +
C
2(ne) 1 < 0 if and only if C < 2 (2(n

e)  1) = ~C:
Thus since ~C > CMAX ; when Assumption 1 holds @~xe@(ne) < 0. Thus since
@(ne)
@ne
> 0; the result
follows. Similarly for v) notice that @x^e@(ne) =  2 +
C
1 2(ne) < 0 if and only if C < C^: Thus
since C^ > CMAX ; @x^e@(ne) < 0: On the other hand,
@~xe
@(ne)
= C(
1 2(ne)
(2(ne) 1)2 ) > 0: Thus, since
@(ne)
@ne
> 0; the result follows. For vi) given that:
@ Pr(n = ne)
@ne
=   (ln)ne 1  
2ne
2
 
n

e   ne2 > 0
@ Pr(n = ne)
@ne
=   (ln)ne 
2ne   1
2
 
n

e   ne2 > 0
Hence since @n

e
@xe
< 0 and @n

e
@xe
< 0 then @ Pr(n=n

e)
@xe
< 0 and since Pr(n = ne) = 1   Pr(n = ne)
the result follows. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2
The optimal strategy for a prot maximizing monopolist media outlet is to choose an editor
with idiosyncratic preference xe such that the demand is maximized. That is xMone must be
such that:
@D
@xe
=
@D
@ne
@ne
@xe
+
@D
@ne
@ne
@xe
= 0
Where:
@D
@ne
=
@F (~xe)
@ne
  @F (x^e)
@ne
@D
@ne
=
@F (~xe)
@ne
  @F (x^e)
@ne
where @F (~xe)@ne =
@
@ne
Z ~xe(ne)
0
f(x)dx: Hence applying Leibnizs rule:
@F (~xe)
@ne
=
@
@ne
Z ~xe(ne ;ne)
0
f(x)dx = f(~xe(n

e; n

e))
@~xe(n

e; n

e)
@ne
thus,
@D
@ne
= f(~xe(n

e; n

e))
@~xe(n

e; n

e)
@ne
  f(x^e(ne; ne))
@x^e(n

e)
@ne
similarly
@D
@ne
= f(~xe(n

e; n

e))
@~xe(n

e; n

e)
@ne
  f(x^e(ne; ne))
@x^e(n

e; n

e)
@ne
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Hence given (23) and (24) the rst order condition reduces to:
@D
@ne
@ne
@xe
=   @D
@ne
@ne
@xe
hence: 
@~xe(ne ;ne)
@ne
@ne
@xe
+
@~xe(ne ;ne)
@ne
@ne
@xe


@x^e(ne)
@ne
@ne
@xe
+
@x^e(ne ;ne)
@ne
@ne
@xe
 = f(x^e(ne; ne))
f(~xe(ne; ne))
(32)
where
~xe(n

e; n

e) =
 
1
2
+ 
n

e   1
n

e + 1
  C 1
n

e + 1
n

e   ne
1  ne
!
x^e(n

e; n

e) =
1
2
   1
n

e + 1

1  ne

+ C
1
n

e + 1
n

e   ne
n

e   1
First of all notice that for   12 it is always the case that x^e(ne; ne) > 0 and ~xe(ne; ne) < 1:
Hence, both sides of the market for news will never be fully covered regardless of the type of
editor chosen by a media outlet.23 Moreover,
@~xe(n

e; n

e)
@ne
= C (ln)
n

e
n

e + 1
1  ne 
1  ne2 > 0
@~xe(n

e; n

e)
@ne
= (ln)
n

e 
n

e + 1
2
 
2   C
ne + 1
1  ne
!
< 0
similarly
@x^e(n

e; n

e)
@ne
= (ln)
n

e 
n

e + 1
2
 
2   C 
ne + 1 
n

e   1
!
< 0
@x^e(n

e; n

e)
@ne
=  C (ln)
n

e

1  ne

 
n

e   12  ne + 1 > 0
hence
@~xe(n

e; n

e)
@xe
  @x^e(n

e)
@xe
= 2 (ln)2
(1  nene ) 
n

e   ne
2664 2

2n

e+2n

e

(1+n

en

e )+2n

en

e (n

e+n

e )
(2n

e 1)(1 2ne )
+C
4

2n

e (1 2ne )2+2ne (1 2ne )2

(n

e ne )
(1+n

e )(n

e+1)(n

e 1)3(1 ne )3
3775
(33)
In other words, for xe > 12 an increase in xe increases x^e more than ~xe (and viceversa for xe <
1
2):
Hence:
@~xe(ne ;ne)
@ne
@ne
@xe
+
@~xe(ne ;ne)
@ne
@ne
@xe
@x^e(ne)
@ne
@ne
@xe
+
@x^e(ne ;ne)
@ne
@ne
@xe
8<:
> 1 for xe < 12
= 1 for xe = 12
< 1 for xe > 12
Therefore xe = 12 is always a stationary point since in such case x^ 12
(ne; ne) = 1   ~x 1
2
(ne; ne)
and thus by the symmetry of the distribution function, f(x^ 1
2
(ne; ne)) = f(~x 1
2
(ne; ne)):24 On the
other hand, for xeR >
1
2 to be a stationary point it must be the case that
f(x^eR (n

e ;n

e))
f(~xeR (n

e ;n

e))
< 1: Hence
23The same result applies in a model where  2 R+ and supp [f(x)] = R:
24Notice that by the second order conditions @
2D
@2xe

xe=
1
2
= 0:
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f(x^eR(n

e; n

e)) < f(~xeR(n

e; n

e)): Thus since
@~xe
@xe

xe=1=2
> 0, this implies that ~xeR(n

e; n

e) >
1   x^eR(ne; ne): Hence it must be the case that f is such that @f(~xe(n

e ;n

e))
@xe

xe=1=2
> 0: Notice
also that since the distribution function f is symmetric around 12 ; so it must be the demand
function. Hence, by symmetry it must exist also a stationary point xeL = 1   xeR such that
f(x^eL (n

e ;n

e))
f(~xeL (n

e ;n

e))
> 1; that is @f(x^(n

e ;n

e))
@xe

xe=1=2
< 0: That is, if F (x) is such that (16) holds there
is a unique stationary point at xe = 12 . Viceversa, if F (x) is such that (17) holds, we may also
have stationary points at xe 6= 12 :
Lets study the nature of such stationary points. Lets focus on xe > 12 : Then
@D
@xe
> 0 if and
only if:
f(~xe(n

e; n

e))
@~xe(n

e; n

e)
@xe
> f(x^e(n

e; n

e))
@x^e(n

e; n

e)
@xe
Where @~xe(n

e ;n

e)
@xe
> 0 if and only if:
C < 2
2n

e

1  ne
3 
n

e + 1


2n

e
 
2n

e   12 + 2ne  1  2ne2 = ~C (34)
Moreover:
@ ~C
@ne
=   (ln) 4
2n

e+n

e

1  ne
20@2ne + 1+ 1 2nene

2n

e 1
2
+22n

e

2n

e 1

2n

e (2n

e 1)2+2ne (1 2ne )2
1A
2n

e
 
2n

e   12 + 2ne  2ne   12 > 0
@ ~C
@ne
=   (ln) 4
2n

e

n

e + 1

1  ne
3 
2n

e

4n

e   1


2n

e
 
2n

e   12 + 2ne  2ne   122 > 0
hence
@ ~C
@xe
=
@ ~C
@ne
@ne
@xe
+
@ ~C
@ne
@ne
@xe
< 0 (35)
that is:
~C < ~C

xe=
1
2
= 
266641  
 
ne jxe=12
!


ne jxe=12

+ 1
37775 = CMaxxe= 12
hence ~C is always lower than CMax

xe=
1
2
: On the other hand:
@x^e(n

e)
@xe
=
2 (ln)2 
n

e   ne
0@ 2   C ne + 1 
n

e   1
! 
2n

e
n

e + 1 
1  ne  ne + 12
!
  C
2n

e

1  ne

 
n

e   13
1A
therefore

@x^e(ne)
@ne
@ne
@xe
+
@x^e(ne ;ne)
@ne
@ne
@xe

> 0 if and only if:
C < 2
0B@2ne

n

e + 1

n

e   1
3
2n

e
 
2n

e   12 + 2ne  1  2ne2
1CA = C^
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where:
@C^
@ne
= 4 (ln)
2n

e

n

e   1
3 
n

e + 1

2n

e

2n

e   1
2
+ 22n

e+2n

e

1  2ne

2n

e
 
2n

e   12 + 2ne  2ne   12 < 0
moreover:
@C^
@ne
= 2 (ln)

n

e   1
2 ne+2ne

2n

e

2n

e   1
2 
n

e (1 + n

e ) + 1

+ 2

2n

e   1
2
2n

e


2n

e
 
2n

e   12 + 2ne  2ne   122 < 0
hence @C^@xe =
@C^
@ne
@ne
@xe
+ @C^@ne
@ne
@xe
> 0: Therefore:
C^ = 2
0B@2ne

n

e + 1

n

e   1
3
2n

e
 
2n

e   12 + 2ne  1  2ne2
1CA > C^
xe=
1
2
= 

1  ne

 
1 + n

e
 = CMax
xe=
1
2
therefore it is always the case that for xe > 12 ;
@x^e(ne ;ne)
@xe
> 0: Thus since for C > ~C; when xe  12
an increase in xe increases x^e and decreases ~xe: Hence, for C > ~C an increase in xe decreases
the demand for news. Lets now focus on C < ~C where @x^e(n

e ;n

e)
@xe
> 0 and @~xe(n

e ;n

e)
@xe
> 0 and
analyze the two di¤erent cases. Lets now analyze the two di¤erent cases separately.
1. Suppose F (x) is such that (16) holds. We show by contradiction that in this case, xe = 12
is always the global maximum. Suppose not. Then for xe > 12 it must be the case that
@D
@xe
> 0: Hence:
f(~xe(n

e; n

e))

@~xe(n

e; n

e)
@ne
@ne
@xe
+
@~xe(n

e; n

e)
@ne
@ne
@xe

> f(x^e(n

e; n

e))

@x^e(n

e; n

e)
@ne
@ne
@xe
+
@x^e(n

e)
@ne
@ne
@xe

From condition (33) we know that @~xe(n

e ;n

e)
@xe
<
@x^e(ne ;ne)
@xe
. Then it must be the case that
f(~xe(n

e; n

e)) > f(x^e(n

e; n

e)) which contradicts the initial assumption. Hence, in this
rst case it is always the case that xe = 12 is a global maximum since regardless whether
C < ~C or C  ~C; @D@xe < 0 for xe > 12 :
2. Suppose F (x) is such that (17) holds. In such case, xe = 12 cannot be a global maximum
since @D@xe > 0

xe=
1
2
because:

@~xe(n

e; n

e)
@ne
@ne
@xe
+
@~xe(n

e; n

e)
@ne
@ne
@xe

xe=
1
2
=

@x^e(n

e; n

e)
@ne
@ne
@xe
+
@x^e(n

e)
@ne
@ne
@xe

xe=
1
2
that is an increase in xe at 12 increases ~xe and x^e by the same amount. Hence, since for
any xe > 12 in this case f(~xe(n

e; n

e)) > f(x^e(n

e; n

e));
@D
@xe

xe=
1
2
> 0: Thus the stationary
point xMoneR >
1
2 such that (32) is satised will be a global maximum on [
1
2 ; 1]:That is, in
this second case we have that for 12  xe < xMoneR :
@
@xe
Z ~xe(ne ;ne)
1
2
f(x)dx >
 @@xe
Z 1
2
x^e(ne ;ne)
f(x)dx

However, the editor cannot be too extremist. Indeed, ~xe is increasing in xe as long as
32
condition (34) is satised. Moreover since by (35) as xe increases ~C decreases, the demand
of news may increase in xe up to the point where C = ~C: That is the most extremist
editor such that ~xe is increasing in xe will be the one with preferences xR satisfying the
following condition:
~C (ne(xR); n

e(xR)) = C (36)
or, equivalently, we can write the above condition as:
~x(xeR) = ~x

~C

xR
= C

Hence C < ~C

xR
is a necessary condition to have:
@
@xe
Z ~xe(ne ;ne)
1
2
f(x)dx >
 @@xe
Z 1
2
x^e(ne ;ne)
f(x)dx

That is, C < ~C

xR
is a necessary condition that needs to be satised for the media outlet
being able to increase its demand by choosing a less moderate editor.
By the symmetry of f; choosing an editor with symmetric preferences will also be prot-
maximizing. That is, we have two global maxima in this case xMoneR and x
Mon
eL
= 1 xMoneR :
Hence, an analogous proof applies to show that for xMoneL < xe  12 : @@xe
Z 1
2
x^e(ne ;ne)
f(x)dx
 > @@xe
Z ~xe(ne ;ne)
1
2
f(x)dx
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 3
Lets start with the case where (16) holds. We show that in this case the unique equilibrium
is such that x1e = x
2
e =
1
2 : Suppose that media outlet 1 deviates by choosing x
1
e > x
2
e =
1
2 :
If media outlet one deviates, the indi¤erent viewer, i.e., the viewer who will be indi¤erent
between watching media outlet 1 and media outlet 2 is the one having preferences xI such that
UI(W1) = UI(W2): Hence:
xI(n

e1 ; n

e1)

xe=x1e;x
2
e=
1
2
=
1
2
+

n

e1n

e1   1

0@(1  ne2 )

n

e1   ne1


n

e2 + 1
   ne1   11  ne1
1A
Lets now analyze the no-deviation condition. The no-deviation condition is such that @xe > 12
such that the demand if deviating is higher than the demand if not deviating. The demand if
not deviate
DNDev(x1e) = D
NDev
 
x2e

=
1
2
h
F ( ~xjxe= 12 )  F ( x^jxe= 12 )
i
=

F ( ~xjxe= 12 )  F

1
2

Instead the demand if deviates is:
DDev(x1e) =
h
F ( ~xjx1e)  F (xI jx1e)
i
Hence given a uniform distribution it must be the case that:
xI(n

e1 ; n

e1)

xe=x1e;x
2
e=
1
2
  1
2
> ~xjx1e   ~xjxe= 12
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hence no-deviation if and only if:
C > CTHR = 

2n

e1   1

1  ne1


n

e1n

e1   1
2
0@

n

e1   ne1


n

e1 + 1
   (1  ne2 )
n

e2 + 1
 ne1 + 1
1A
where CTHR > 0 if and only if 
n

e1   ne1


n

e1 + 1

n

e1 + 1
 > (1  ne2 )
n

e2 + 1

where
@
@ne1
0@

n

e1   ne1


n

e1 + 1

n

e1 + 1

1A = (ln) ne1
n

e1 + 1
2 < 0
@
@ne1
0@

n

e1   ne1


n

e1 + 1

n

e1 + 1

1A =
0B@  (ln) ne1
n

e1 + 1
2
1CA > 0
Hence @@xe
 

ne1 n

e1



ne1+1


ne1+1

!
> 0 if and only if:
(1  ne1ne1 )

2n

e1n

e1

n

e1 + n

e1

+

2n

e1 + 2n

e1

(1 + n

e1n

e1 )

> 0
which can never be the case since (1  ne1ne1 ) < 0 for xe > 12 : Hence:
@
@xe
0@

n

e1   ne1


n

e1 + 1

n

e1 + 1

1A < 0
which implies that:
n

e1   ne1


n

e1 + 1

n

e1 + 1
 <

n

e1   ne1


n

e1 + 1

n

e1 + 1


xe=
1
2
=
(1  ne2 )
n

e2 + 1
 (37)
hence CTHR < 0: Therefore, in a duopoly when the distribution of citizensidiosyncratic pref-
erences is such that (16) holds (and where citizens watch at most one media report), there will
never be an incentive to deviate from the equilibrium at x1e = 1 x2e = 12 : Moreover, notice that
this is the unique Nash equilibrium. If the two media outlets choose editors with di¤erent pref-
erences, then each of them would clearly have an incentive to deviate by choosing a moderate
editor.
Lets now analyze the case where (17) holds. First of all, in order to ensure that there is someone
willing to watch media 1 the following condition must be satised
xI(n

e1 ; n

e1)

xe=x1e;x
2
e=
1
2
< ~x(x1e)
34
that is:
C < C = 2

1  ne1


n

e2 + 1
 (38)
where obviously C > 0:25 Lets now analyze the no deviation condition for C < C. Media outlet
1 will not hire a non-moderate editor as long as:
F (xI jx1e)
F ( ~xjx1e)  F ( ~xjxe= 12 )
>
1
2
Let CDuop be the opportunity cost solving such equation:
F
 
1
2 +


ne1 n

e1 1

 
(1 n

e2 )


ne1 n

e1



ne2+1
   ne1   11  ne1!!
F

1
2 + 

ne1 1

ne1+1
  C 1

ne1+1

ne1 ne1
1 ne1

  F
 
1
2 + 

1 ne2


ne2+1
  C
! > 1
2
(39)
Now let CDev = min

C;CDuop; CMax
	
then for C 2  0; CDev media outlet 1 will have an
incentive to deviate.26 Hence, in such case there is no equilibrium where both media outlets
choose a moderate editor. Moreover, CDev must be lower than CMax since for C = CMax
only citizens with xi = 12 watch news reports and thus rm 1 will never have an incentive to
deviate. And for C > CMax none will watch news reports. Lets now show that it can never
exist an equilibrium with xe1 = xe2 6= 12 : Suppose the two media outlets choose the same type
of non-moderate editors (e.g., xe1 = xe2 >
1
2). By doing so their demand would be
D1(xe1 = xe2) = D
2(xe1 = xe2) =
F (~xe1)  F (x^e1)
2
while if media outlet 2 chooses an editor with preferences xe2 = 1  xe1 its demand would be:
D2(xe2 = 1  xe1) =
1
2
  F (x^e2)
where by symmetry x^e2 = 1  ~xe1 : Hence F (x^e2) = 1  F (~xe1) : Thus no-deviation if and only
if:
F (~xe1)  F (x^e1)
2
> F (~xe1) 
1
2
but since xe1 >
1
2 ; then ~xe1 > 1   x^e1 and given condition (17) the above condition cannot
hold. An analogous proof applies for xe1 = xe2 <
1
2 : Hence for C 2
 
0; CDev

the unique
Nash equilibrium is such that xe1 = 1   xe2 : Suppose xe1 = 1   xe2 > 12 :27 For this to be an
equilibrium, the following conditions must be satised for media outlet 1, 8" > 0:28
1) No deviation to the right:
F (xI jxe=xe1+">1 xe2 ) 
1
2
= F ( ~xjxe=xe1+">1 xe2 )  F ( ~xjxe1=1 xe2 )
25Notice that C > CMax as long as 2

1 n

e1



ne2+1
   

1 n

e2



ne2+1
 > 0 where a su¢ cient condition for this
to be true is  > 23 :
26Clearly, if CDev < 0; rm 1 will never have an incentive to deviate. We have seen in the previous
case that when F is a uniform c.d.f. CDev = CTHR < 0:
27Obviously xe1 = 1  xe2 < 12 will also be an equilibrium when xe1 = 1  xe2 > 12 is an equilibrium.
28Symmetric conditions apply for media outlet 2:
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2) No deviation to the left:
1
2
  F (xI jxe=xe1 "<1 xe2 ) = F ( ~xjxe1=1 xe2 )  F ( ~xjxe=xe1 "<1 xe2 )
hence the above two conditions together imply that for xe1 = 1  xe2 > 12 to be an equilibrium
it must be the case that for "! 0:
@F (xI)
@xe

xe1=1 xe2
=
@F (~x)
@xe

xe1=1 xe2
(40)
Given that for C < CDev the opposite of (39) holds, @F (xI)@xe

xe=1=2
< @F (~x)@xe

xe=1=2
. Moreover,
taking the derivative of xI with respect to xe and then evaluating it in a symmetric equilibrium:
@xI(n

e1 ; n

e1)
@xe

x1e=1 x2e
=
 (ln)2
h
n

e1

n

e1   2ne1

(1  ne1 ) + ne1

2n

e1   ne1

(n

e1   1)
i

n

e1   1

1  ne1

(n

e1   ne1 )2
> 0
(41)
hence given (17), @F (xI)@xe

xe1=1 xe2
> 0: On the other hand, we know from the proof of propo-
sition 2 that ~xe is increasing in xe only as long as xe < xR where xR is the solution of (36).
Hence, given (17):
@F (~x)
@xe

xe1=1 xe2

> 0 for xe < xR
< 0 for xe > xR
Hence, it will always exist a xe1 = 1  xe2 < xR such that condition (40) is satised. Moreover,
since as C decreases
@~xe(ne1 ;n

e1
)
@xe
increases, then when C is lower the RHS of (40) increases.
Hence also the LHS of (40) must increase. Hence, given (41), to increase the LHS of (40) xe
must increase. That is, a lower C is associated with an equilibrium where the two media outlets
choose less moderate editors.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 4
We have to analyze the no-deviation condition with K media outlets. Let ne =  ne be the
stopping thresholds chosen by a moderate editor. The demand media outlet 1 faces if it hires a
moderate editor as all the other media outlets is 8j 2 f2; 3; :::::;Kg:
DNDev(x1e) = D
NDev
 
xje

=
1
K
h
F ( ~xjxe= 12 )  F ( x^jxe= 12 )
i
=
2
K

F ( ~xjxe= 12 )  F (
1
2
)

Instead the demand that media outlet 1 faces if it deviates from such position is:
DDev(x1e) =
h
F ( ~xjx1e)  F (xI jx1e)
i
Hence given a uniform distribution, media outlet 1 will prefer not to hire a moderate editor if
and only if:
~xjx1e   xI jx1e >
2
K

~xjxe= 12  
1
2

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hence:
K > K =
2

ne1 ne1

"


1 ne

n

e+1
  C
#
 1

ne1 n

e1 1

 

ne1 1



ne1+1
   (1 ne )
(n

e+1)
!
  C 1

ne1+1

1 ne1

where the denominator is positive as long as C < C where C is given by (38). Hence, since
we have shown in the proof that C > CMax; then K is always positive. Moreover, our game
satises the properties of Theorem 4 in Dasgupta and Maskin (1986b) for the existence of an
equilibrium in a product competition game. Hence, the K media outlets game possesses a
symmetric mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium. Lets perform some comparative statics.
@K
@ne1
=
2 (ln)n

e1


n

e+1

1  ne

  C

0@ 


ne1 1

ne1 +1
+
ne 1
n

e+1


ne1+n

e1 1
  C

ne1+1

1 ne1

1Ane1   ne1
0BBBBBBBBBBBBB@
1
n

e1   ne1
 +
0B@ n

e1
 

ne1 1

ne1 +1
+
ne 1
n

e+1
!


ne1+m 1
2 + C

ne1+1


ne1 1
2
1CA
0BBB@
0@


ne1 1



ne1 +1
  (1 ne )
(n

e+1)
1A


ne1 n

e1 1
   C

ne1+1

1 ne1

1CCCA
1CCCCCCCCCCCCCA
hence @K

dne1
< 0: On the other hand:
@K
@ne1
=
 
 (ln)2n

e1

ne1 ne1

 


1 ne

n

e+1
  C
!!
0BBB@
0@


ne1 1



ne1 +1
  (1 ne )
(n

e+1)
1A


ne1 n

e1 1
   C 1

ne1+1

1 ne1

1CCCA
2
0BBBBBB@

n

e
ne1+n

e1 (1 n

e1 )+
2ne1


ne1 ne

+
ne1 n

e


ne1 n

e1 2

+
ne1 2n

e1

n

e
ne1 2

+1



ne1+1
2
(n

e+1)


ne1 ne1


ne1+n

e1 1

 
C
0B@
 

ne1 +1
!


ne1 n

e1


ne1 +1

1CA


ne1+1

1 ne1

1CCCCCCA
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hence @K

@ne1
> 0; 8C 2 (0; CMax) and  > 2=3:29 Moreover:
@K
@
=  
2C
 
n

e+

1 n

e1

+
ne1 (n

e1 2ne )+n

e1


ne1 n

e 1



ne1+1

1 ne1

!

n

e1   ne1
  
n

e + 1
 
n

e1
+ne1   1
0@ 


ne1 1

ne1 +1
+
ne 1
n

e+1


ne1+n

e1 1
  C

ne1+1

1 ne1

1A2
< 0
since

n

e +

1  ne1

+ n

e1 (n

e1   2ne ) + ne1

n

e1n

e   1

> 0:Hence
dK
d
=
@K
@
+
@K
@ne1
@ne1
@
+
@K
@ne1
@ne1
@
< 0
since @K

@ < 0;
@K
@ne1
< 0; @K

@ne1
> 0;
@ne1
@ > 0 and
@ne1
@ < 0:Hence as  increases K
 decreases.
Moreover:
dK
dc
=
@K
@ne1
@ne1
@c
+
@K
@ne1
@ne1
@c
hence since we have shown above that @K

@ne1
< 0; @K

@ne1
> 0 and since
@ne1
@c < 0 and
@ne1
@c > 0;
then:
dK
dc
> 0
Moreover,
dK
dC
=
2
0BBB@

n

e+1

1 ne

 C

1 ne1


ne1+1
0@ 1

ne1 n

e1 1

0@


ne1 1
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hence the above is positive if and only if:0@
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which is always true since:
1  ne1

n

e1   1


n

e1   ne1
  

n

e1   ne1


n

e1 + 1

n

e1 + 1
 =  (1  ne1ne1 )2 < 0
and


ne1 n

e1



ne1+1


ne1+1
 < (1 ne )
(n

e+1)
by condition (37). Thus dK

dC > 0: Q.E.D.
29A detailed formal proof showing that  > 2=3 is a su¢ cient condition for @K

@ne1
> 0 is available upon
request to the author.
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